The decision clarifies the requirements for the adaptation of the description to the claims and consolidates the interpretative approach established in G 1\/24.<\/p>\n
With decision G 1\/25, issued on 3 September 2026, the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) of the European Patent Office (EPO) has provided long-awaited clarifications on the adaptation of the description following an amendment to the claims.<\/p>\n
The decision clarifies that the EPC does not impose a general obligation for adaptation of the description to the claims and that adaptation is required only where a discrepancy has concrete legal relevance under the EPC.<\/p>\n
Legal context<\/strong><\/p>\n The decision originates from the referral made by the Technical Board of Appeal in case T 0697\/22. In that case, amendments to the independent claim created an inconsistency with respect to some passages of the description, which continued to define a technical feature in broader terms than the new wording of the claim. This led to the question submitted to the EBA regarding whether or not the description needed to be amended in the presence of such a discrepancy.<\/p>\n The issue arises in a context characterised by a profound divergence in the case law of the Boards of Appeal with two contrasting lines emerging. On the one hand, the first line holds that Art. 84 EPC demand strict consistency between the claims and the description. On the other hand, a second approach (adopted in decisions such as T 56\/21, T1989\/18 and T1444\/20) holds that the claims must be \u201cclear in themselves\u201d and Art. 84 EPC cannot be used to impose the deletion or amendment of parts of the description no longer covered by the claims (the “one-way street” theory).<\/p>\n The EBA’s answer<\/strong><\/p>\n Called upon to resolve this question, the EBA took the opportunity not only to clarify when the adaptation of the description is actually necessary, but also to specify the role of the description in the interpretation of the claims in light of the principles set out in decision G 1\/24.<\/p>\n The EBA has adopted a position between the two prevailing approaches. On the one hand, it rejected the \u201cone-way street\u201d theory and denied that Article 84 EPC concerns only the wording of the claims. On the other hand, it also rejected the view that every inconsistency between the description and the claims automatically requires amendment of the description.<\/p>\n According to the decision, adaptation of the description<\/strong> (including the drawings) is necessary only when the inconsistency introduced by the amendment of the claims leads to a concrete violation of specific requirements of the EPC<\/strong>, in particular results in non-compliance with Articles 52 to 57, 76(1), 83, 84, 123(2) or 123(3) EPC.<\/p>\n If the claims of a European patent, or patent application, are amended during proceedings before the departments of the European Patent Office, or in appeal proceedings, and the amendment introduces an inconsistency between the amended claims and the description, including any drawings, of the patent, or application, and because of that inconsistency Articles 52 to 57, 76(1), 83, 84, 123(2) or 123(3) EPC are not complied with, it is necessary to adapt the description, including any drawings, to the amended claims so as to remove that inconsistency.\u201c<\/em><\/p>\n Accordingly, there is no general obligation to bring the description into conformity with the claims.<\/p>\n In fact, the EBA expressly states that the EPC does not require the description to be adapted to the claims \u201cmerely for the sake of formal concordance\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n A new definition of \u201cinconsistency\u201d between the description and the claims<\/strong><\/p>\n Based on these principles, the EBA establishes a definition of \u201cinconsistency<\/strong>\u201d between the description and the claims, which serves to delineate the cases in which the description must be adapted.<\/p>\n The decision clarifies that: “An inconsistency between the claims and the description, and any drawings, exists where one or more statements in the description, including the drawings, suggest an understanding of a claim which is incompatible with the apparent meaning of the claim, and that incompatibility cannot readily be resolved by applying the principles set out in G 1\/24<\/em>.\u201d.<\/p>\n In particular, the EBA noted that an inconsistency arises \u201cif<\/em> the person skilled in the art, reading the claim in the light of the description and any drawings, were left in real doubt as to the meaning of the claim<\/strong>, there is however an inconsistency.”<\/em><\/p>\n In this context, the reference to the \u201creal doubt\u201d criterion<\/strong> is, therefore, particularly significant. The EBA, indeed, identifies the persistence of a real doubt regarding the meaning of the claim as the element that distinguishes a mere textual discrepancy from a genuine inconsistency relevant for EPC purposes.<\/p>\n The mere fact that the description continues to contain examples or embodiments no longer covered by the scope of the claim is not, therefore, sufficient to require an amendment to the description.<\/p>\n The determining factor is not the textual inconsistency as such, but rather its ability to give rise to a concrete interpretive problem.<\/p>\n However, the EBA does not provide detailed guidance on the threshold at which an interpretative doubt becomes significant enough to qualify as a real doubt, <\/em>requiring the description to be adapted. It is foreseeable that the practical application of this concept will be gradually defined by subsequent case law.<\/p>\n The practical implications of the decision<\/strong><\/p>\n Certainly, it is clear from this decision that adapting the description is not a formal requirement, but rather a corrective measure to address a legally significant inconsistency that affects compliance with the EPC.<\/p>\n In this sense, one of the most significant effects of the decision could be a scaling back of the highly formalistic approach that has characterised some of EPO practice in recent years. This approach has often required applicants to systematically eliminate or “neutralise” any embodiment not covered by the claims.<\/p>\n The focus appears to be shifting from searching for literal formal concordance between the description and the claims to assessing the legal significance of any identified inconsistencies under the EPC.<\/p>\n From a procedural standpoint, the EBA has clarified that the amendment of the claims and any adaptation of the description <\/strong>form part of a single corrective action<\/strong> and should, preferably, be carried out during the same procedural stage. In fact, although the need to amend the description depends on the legal significance of the inconsistency introduced by the claim amendments, the EBA notes that, once such a need has been established, adaptation of the description is not a separate action but is part of the same procedural stage wherein the claims are amended.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Reference to G 1\/24<\/strong><\/p>\n Another noteworthy aspect of the decision concerns the relationship between G 1\/25 and the preceding G 1\/24.<\/p>\n In answering the question referred, the EBA has<\/strong>, in fact, referred to and reiterated <\/strong>the the interpretative principles established in the recent decision G 1\/24, clarifying that the interpretation of the claims cannot disregard the description and the drawings, stating that<\/strong>:<\/p>\n This decision, therefore, confirms what was previously established in G 1\/24 directly applying the interpretive principles set out in that decision and reaching significant conclusions regarding Article 84 EPC. This marks a further step towards moving beyond the traditional theory that the clarity and meaning of the claims can be assessed independently of the description.<\/p>\n Conclusions<\/strong><\/p>\n In conclusion, decision G 1\/25 is one of the most significant decisions of recent years regarding Article 84 EPC.<\/p>\n The EBA has rejected both the argument that there is a general obligation to align the description with the claims and the opposing view that such alignment is substantively irrelevant for the purposes of satisfying the requirements of Article 84 EPC. Instead, the criterion identified is that of the legal<\/strong> significance of the inconsistency<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Therefore, while the decision does not eliminate the practice of adapting the description, it does redefine its legal basis by shifting the focus from purely formal concordance to an assessment of the actual significance of the inconsistency for the purposes of compliance with the EPC<\/strong>.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n\n